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NOTE 
MERITOR SAVINGS BANK V. VINSON: 
TITLE VII LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,! the United States Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of sexual harassment for the 
first time.2 The Court held that when sexual harassment creates 
a hostile or offensive working environment, it is actionable under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The Court interpreted 
Title VII as demonstrating a congressional intent to preserve the 
economic, psychological and emotional benefits of employment.' 
This interpretation has been advanced by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)G and in lower court 
opinions.6 The Supreme Court rejected the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that an employer is strictly lia-
ble for hostile environment sex discrimination regardless of the 
circumstances of the case. '1 Instead, the Court stated that courts 
1. _, u.s. _, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986). 
2. [d. at 2409. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1976). Title VII states (in relevant part): "It is an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because 
of sex ••. " (emphasis added), [d. 
4. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. 
5. Congress established the EEOC to interpret and enforce Title VII in 1964; See 
generally EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985). 
6. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Horn 
v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793 F.2d 714 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986); Tomkins v. Public 
Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 
F.Supp. 78 (D. Alaska 1985). 
7. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
379 
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must look to agency principles for guidance in determining em-
ployer liability,S and must examine the totality of the circum-
stances.9 Notice or absence of notice to the employer of the har-
assment will not be dispositive of the liability issue.10 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. TITLE VII 
In 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company/l the Supreme 
Court stated that, in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Congress intended "[to remove all] artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers to employment specifically, when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial 
or other impermissible classification(sic}.m2 The Court has sub-
sequently construed the statute to prohibit discrimination which 
acts to deny an individual employment or creates an offensive 
work environment.13 
The legislative history accompanying the 1972 amendment 
to Title VII reveals a heightened awareness of the problem of 
sex discrimination.14 The Report of the House of Representa-
tives states: "[d]iscrimination against women is no less serious 
8. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2408. Title VII defines "employer" as any employer or agent 
of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). See generally Vermuluen, Employer Liabil-
ity Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 499 (1981); Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: 
Employer Liability For Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B. U. L. REV. 535 
(1981); Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Ti-
tle VII, 97 HARv. L. R. 1449 (1984). 
9. Vinson, _ U.S. -> 106 S.Ct. at 2404. 
10.Id. 
11. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
12. Id. at 431. An impermissible classification is when race, national origin or sex is 
used as a criteria for employment decisions. 
13. See generally, McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,801 (1973) ("In 
the implementation of [employment decisions], it is abundantly cIe!ll' that Title VII tol-
erates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1971) ("In forbidding employer's to discrimi-
nate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sexual stereotypes. 
[Title VII] subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job oppor-
tunities and enjoyment which have plagued women in the past."). 
14. Congress included sex in Title VII in an attempt to defeat the bill; See generally 
Kanowitz, Sex Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 305, 310-13 (1968-69). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss3/3
1987] TITLE VII LIABILITY 381 
than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to 
be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type 
of unlawful discrimination."1~ However, as late as 1975, courts 
dismissed sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII as 
isolated employment practices undeserving of judicial 
recognition.I6 
In response to the judicial reluctance to recognize sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII, in 1980, the EEOC issued 
guidelines to aid courts confronted with sexual harassment com-
plaints.17 Pursuant to the guidelines, unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature that occur in the workplace consti-
tute sexual harassment. IS The EEOC recognize two types of sex-
ual harassment claims: 1) a quid pro quo claim, where submis-
sion to or rejection of sexual advances is made a condition of 
employment or is used as a basis for employment decisions;I9 
and 2) a hostile environment claim, in which sexual harassment 
unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance 
or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work 
environment.2o 
The guidelines also set standards for employer liability.21 
Under the guidelines, an employer is responsible for the acts of 
its supervisory employees or agents regardless of whether the 
15. H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., (1971), 1st Sess.2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. 
Code, Congo & Ad. News 2137, 2141. 
16. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lombe, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975)(Super-
visor's sexual harassment of subordinate employee viewed by court as merely satisfying a 
personal urge); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 422 F.Supp. 553 (D. N.J. 
1976) (Sexual harassment not sex discrimination under Title VII), rev'd 568 F.2d 1044 
(3d Cir. 1977). 
17. The preamble to the EEOC's intermin guidelines states: U[s]exual harassment 
continues to be especially widespread. Because of the continued prevalence of this un-
lawful practice, the Commission has determined that there is a need for guidelines in 
this area of Title VII law." 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604) 
A Redbook magazine survey on sexual harassment found that 88% of the 9,000 female 
respondents reported they experience sexual harassment at the workplace. See SUBCOMM. 
ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 96TH 
CONG.2D SESS., REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL. GOVERNMENT 153 
(Comm. Print 1980). 
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). 
19. [d. at (a)(l), (a)(2). 
20. [d. at (a)(3). 
21. [d. at (c). 
3
Egan: Title VII Liability
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
382 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:379 
acts were authorized or whether the employer knew or should 
have known of the activity.22 The EEOC guidelines also encom-
pass sexual harassment perpetrated by co-employees and non-
employees. In these instances, employers are liable only if they 
were aware of the harassment and took no prompt remedial 
action.23 
B. CASE LAW 
1. The Development of Discriminatory Work Environment 
Claim Under Title VII 
In 1971, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. 
EEOC24 was the first court to recognize that Title VII protects 
an individual from an emotionally or psychologically offensive 
work environment.25 The court held that an hispanic worker es-
tablished a Title VII violation by alleging that her employer's 
segregation of his ethnic clients created a working environment 
in which she was discriminated against.26 The Rogers court ex-
plained that employment discrimination was developing into a 
subtle and sophisticated practice, affecting not only the eco-
nomic benefits of work but also an employee's relationship with 
her work environment and other intangible benefits.27 The 
Roger's court concluded that "[the] psychological as well as eco-
nomic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection . . . ."28 
Therefore, employees must be protected against an employer's 
ability to create working environments "[s]o heavily polluted 
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and 
psychological stability of minority group workers .... "29 Courts 
developed the principle of hostile or offensive environment dis-
crimination in the context of race, religion and national origin 
discrimination.30 Several cases have held that repeated deroga-
22. ld. 
23. ld. at (d). 
24. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
25. ld. 
26. ld. at 238. 
27. ld. 
28. ld. 
29. ld. 
30. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Assoc., 509 F.2d 140 (5th 
Cir. 1975)(Compulsory attendance at religious meeting constitutes a discriminatory work 
environment); Gary v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(Title VII 
grants an employee the right to work in an environment free of racial intimidation); 
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tory comments, racial slurs and religious coercion constitutes a 
hostile environment violative of Title VII.31 However, isolated 
racial slurs or epithets do not violate Title VII because they are 
not sufficiently pervasive so as to affect a term or condition of 
employment.32 
2. Sexual Harrassment Hostile Environment 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981, 
was the first court to hold that pervasive sexual harassment in 
the workplace may constitute a claim of hostile environment sex 
discrimination under Title VII.33 In Bundy v. Jackson,34 the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff 
was entitled to relief under Title VII because she had worked in 
an environment where unsolicited sexual propositions and sexu-
ally demeaning comments were the standard operating proce-
dure.31\ The court stated: 
The relevance of these 'discriminatory environ-
ment' cases to sexual harassment is beyond seri-
ous dispute .... Racial slurs, though intentional 
and directed at individuals, may still be just ver-
bal insults, yet they too may create Title VII lia-
bility. How then can sexual harassment, which in-
jects the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into 
the general work environment and which always 
represents an intentional assault on an individ-
ual's innermost privacy not be illegal?36 
The court held that sexual harassment constitutes illegal sex 
discrimination regardless of whether it results in a loss of job 
Carridi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977). 
31. Erebia v. Chrysler Plastics Prod. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985)(Subordi· 
nates repeatedly subjected supervisor to racial epithets; managements failure to take ac-
tion violated Title VII); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp. 521 (E.D. N.Y. 1985)(re-
peated episodes of offensive and humiliating conduct violates Title VII); Bailey v. 
Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (frequent use of derogatory racial names vio-
lates Title VII); Weiss v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984)(Repeated use 
of religious slurs in front of peers constitutes a hostile environment). 
32. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238; Carridi, 568 F.2d at 87; Gary, 545 F.2d at 196; See 
generally Larson & Larson, I Employment Discrimination § 84.10 (1986). 
33. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 at 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
34. [d. 
35. Id. at 939. 
36. [d. at 935. 
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benefits.37 
The Eleventh Circuit further defined discriminatory work 
environment sexual harassment claims in Henson v. City of 
Dundee38 in 1982. The plaintiff in Henson complained of three 
types of sexual harassment.39 First, she claimed her supervisor 
had created a discriminatory work environment by repeatedly 
subjecting her and a co-worker to demeaning sexual inquiries, 
vulgarities and unwelcome sexual advances.4° Second, Henson 
claimed she was constructively discharged due to the sexual har-
assment.41 Finally, she complained she was denied a promotion 
because she rejected her supervisor's sexual advances.42 In es-
sence, Henson alleged a hostile environment claim and a quid 
pro quo claim.43 
The court distinguished the quid pro quo harassment claim 
from the hostile environment claim.44 The court noted that in 
making promotion decisions the supervisor is acting within the 
scope of his actual or apparent authority.45 Therefore, when a 
supervisor demands sexual favors as a quid pro quo to a promo-
tion, the supervisor's conduct can be imputed to the employer.46 
The court held that "[a]n employer is strictly liable for the ac-
tions of its supervisors, that amount to sexual discrimination or 
sexual harassment resulting in a tangible job detriment to the 
subordinate employee."47 The court rejected the notion that an 
37. [d. at 948. The court added that there is no need for a plaintiff alleging sexual 
harassment to prove that she resisted the harassment. The court explained that if a wo-
man is required to show that she resisted the harassment, she would be faced with: 
[a] cruel trilemma, she can endure the harassment. She can 
attempt to oppose it with little hope of success, either legally 
or practically but with every prospect of making the job even 
less tolerable for her. Or she can leave her job, with little hope 
of legal relief and the likely prospect of another job where she 
will face harassment anew. 
[d. at 946. 
38. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
39. [d. at 899. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. at 900-01 
42. [d. at 900. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 910. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 910. The court set forth plaintiff's prima facie case for a quid pro quo 
claim: 
6
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employer can escape liability by taking remedial action to stop 
the harassment.48 ' 
In distinguishing a hostile environment claim from a quid 
pro quo claim, the court stated that when a supervisor creates a 
hostile or offensive work environment he is acting outside the 
scope of his actual or apparent authority.49 The court explained 
that a supervisor's ability to create a discriminatory work envi-
ronment is not enhanced by his supervisory position.IIO On the 
contrary, the supervisor harasses and insults a subordinate em-
ployee for his own reasons. 111 The harassment can not be im-
puted to the employer unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and 
failed to take prompt remedial action.1I2 Notice to the employer 
can be demonstrated by showing that the plaintiff complained to 
higher management of the harassment or by showing that the 
harassment was so pervasive that constructive knowledge of it 
can be imputed to the employer.1I3 
1) the employee' belongs to a protected group. 2) the em-
ployee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment. 3) 
The harassment complained of was based upon sex. 4) The 
employee's reaction to harassment complained of affected 
tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment. The acceptance or rejec-
tion of the harassment by an employee must be an express or 
implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of 
a tangible job detriment in order to create liability. 5) Respon-
deat superior: The employer is strictly liable for sexual har-
assment by supervisors that cause a tangible job detriment. 
ld. at 908 (emphasis added). 
48. ld. at 910 n.19. 
49. ld. at 910. 
50.ld. 
5!. ld. 
52.ld. 
53. ld. The court also set forth a prima facie case for a hostile environment claim: 
1) the employee belongs to a protected group . . . 2) the em-
ployee is subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment: . . . 
[The] conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that the em-
ployee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the 
employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offen-
sive . . . 3) The harassment complained of was based upon 
sex .•.. [T]he plaintiff must show that but for the fact of 
her sex, she would not have been subjected to the harassment 
. • • 4) The harassment complained of affected a 'term, condi-
tion or privilege' of employment: ... [the harassment] must 
be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment. 
7
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In 1983, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Katz v. 
Dole54 created another standard for determining employer liabil-
ity.1I11 That court distinguished a hostile environment claim from 
a disparate treatment claim, in which the ultimate issue is 
whether the plaintiff can prove intent to discriminate on the 
part of the employer.1I6 The disparate treatment theory is used 
in Title VII litigation to prove that an employer intended to dis-
criminate against an individual on the basis of race, national ori-
gin or sex.1I7 The Katz court stated that in a hostile environment 
case, there is no need to prove intent "[because] the sexual ad-
vance or insult almost always will represent 'an intentional as-
sault on an individual's innermost privacy.' "118 
The court set forth a two step analysis for discriminatory 
work environment claims.1I9 Plaintiff must first show that the 
harassment took place, then she must demonstrate that the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the abuse and failed to 
take effective action to put it to an end.60 The plaintiff must 
show that the employer acquiesced in or approved of the harass-
ment so that knowledge of the harassment can be imputed to 
the employer.61 It is then incumbent upon the employer to re-
fute such evidence.62 
In order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case the em-
ployer must establish that he took action reasonably calculated 
to end the harassment.63 The proof must be more than a mere 
showing that the employer had a blanket policy agains~ sexual 
Whether the sexual harassment at the work place is suffi-
ciently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychologi-
cal well being of the employee is a question to be determined 
in light of the totality of the circumstances. 5) Respondeat 
Superior . . • [slhe must show that the employer knew or 
should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
prompt remedial action. 
ld. at 902-05. . 
54. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 198a). 
55. ld. at 253. 
56. ld. at 255. 
57. See generally McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
58. Katz, 709 F.2d at 255, (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 945). 
59. Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56. 
60. ld. at 256. 
61. ld. 
62.ld. 
63.ld. 
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harassment.64 The Katz court held that the plaintiff had satis-
fied her burden of proof by establishing that nontrivial sexual 
harassment took place.65 Not only had she proven that sexual 
harassment was pervasive enough to impute knowledge to the 
employer, but she had also specifically complained to her 
supervisor.66 
Some jurisdictions have held that the employer is automati-
cally liable when its supervisory employees sexually harass 
subordinate employees.67 In 1979, the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. 
Bank of America,68 held that an employer is absolutely liable 
regardless of the form of harassment.69 The court analogized an 
employer's liability under Title VII to other torts committed by 
employees, whether intentional or negligent.7o It stated that the 
doctrine of respondeat superior is routinely applied to the law of 
torts and Title VII violations.71 In the Ninth Circuit, Title VII 
violations are essentially torts for which an employer will be 
held liable if perpetrated by a supervisor of the wronged em-
ployee.72 Other courts rely upon the EEOC guidelines to reach 
the same result.73 
Consistently, courts agree that in order to state a cognizable 
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff 
must show plaintiff must show by examaning .... circum-
stances, that the harrassment by examining the totality of the 
circumstances, the harassment was sufficiently pervasive to ef-
fect a term or condition of employment,74 this differs from a 
quid pro quo claim in that the plaintiff does not have to show 
64.ld. 
65. ld. Nontrivial harassment is harassment which is so pervasive that it effects a 
term or condition of work, See supra, note 30, and accompanying text. 
66. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. 
67. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1982)(EEOC guidelines 
establish liability regardless of notice to the employer); Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 
F.Supp. 78 (D. Alaska 1985)(relying on the EEOC guidelines and Vinson v. Taylor, 753 
F.2d 141) (D.C. Cir. 1985); Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1986). 
68. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
69. ld. at 214. 
70. ld. at 213. 
71.ld. 
72.ld. 
73. See supra note 67, and note 16, and accompanying text. 
74. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 251; Bundy, 641 F.2d at 934; Henson, 682 F.2d at 
847. See generally, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252 (1986); 46 A.L.R. Fed 198 (1980). 
9
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that submission to sexual advances was a condition to a tangible 
job benefit.711 Among the thirteen circuits, there were three dif-
ferent standards of employer liability. Some Circuits had estab-
lished that knowledge would be imputed to the employer if the 
plaintiff could show that she either complained to higher man-
agement or that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive.76 The 
Fourth and Third Circuit held that an employer would be liable 
if the plaintiff could show that the employer manifested an ap-
proval or acquiesced to the harassment.77 Finally, the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Seventh Circuit have held that strict liability would 
be imposed regardless of the employer's knowledge of the 
harassment.78 
III. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Meritor Savings Bank employed Mechelle Vinson from 1974 
to 1978.79 She was hired as a teller trainee.80 During the course 
of her employment, the Branch Manager and Vice President, 
Sidney Taylor, made sexual advances toward her.81 Taylor fon-
dled her in front of customers and other employees, exposed 
himself to her and followed her into the restroom.82 Vinson 
agreed to have sexual relations with Taylor out of fear of losing 
her job.8s They engaged in sexual intercourse 40-50 times and on 
several occasions Taylor violently raped Vinson.84 It was not un-
til Vinson became involved in a steady relationship that she 
75. See supra, note 47 an accompanying text. 
76. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 897; Jones v. Flagship, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
1986)(a hostile environment claim requires a higher burden of proof than a quid pro quo 
claim); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986)(Plaintiff must show that 
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take remedial 
action); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 597 F.Supp. 637 (M.D. Alabama 
1983)(the court relies on Henson's prima facie case). 
77. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric 
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3rd 
Cir. 1983); Robson v. Eva's Supermarket, 538 F.Supp. 857 (D.C. Ohio 1932); Stringer v. 
Pennsylvania Dep't. of Community Affairs, 446 F.Supp 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Harrison v. 
Reed Rubber Co., 603 F.Supp. 145 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
78. See supra, note 67 and accompanying text. 
79. Vinson v. Taylor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1) 30708 (CCH 1980). 
80. [d. at 14690. 
81. [d. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. at 14687. 
84. [d. 
10
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ceased submitting to Taylor's advances.85 Ultimately, the Bank 
fired Vinson for excessive use of sick leave.86 
Vinson filed an action against the Bank and Taylor in 1979, 
alleging sexual harassment sex giscrimination.87 The District of 
Columbia district court found that Vinson's promotions from 
teller-trainee to assistant branch manager were based solely on 
merit.88 The court held that because Vinson had not been re-
quired to grant Taylor or any other Bank employees sexual fa-
vors as a condition of employment,89 or to obtain her promo-
tions,90 she had not stated a cognizable sexual harassment 
claim.91 The court concluded that if Vinson and Taylor were in-
volved in a relationship, it was voluntary.92 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded on the basis that the district court did not afford Vin-
son the full scope of protection she was entitled.9s It stated that 
the district court erred in not considering whether Vinson was 
entitled to Title VII relief under a hostile environment claim 
rather than focusing on whether Vinson was denied or awarded 
a tangible job benefit as a result of submitting to Taylor's sexual 
advances.94 The court of appeals stated that Vinson's grievance 
clearly warranted an inquiry into whether or not she was 
"[s]ubjected to 'sexually stereotyped insults' or 'demeaning pro-
positions' that illegally poisoned the 'psychological and emo-
tional work environment' ."95 
The court of appeals further stated that voluntariness was 
not an issue because the statute refers to whether the advances 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d., See generally, Catherine MacKinnon, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN at 46-47 (1979), (MacKinnon argues that one can not actually determine if pro-
motions are based upon merit or whether they are based upon submission to the ad-
vances. Since the woman submitted to the advances, the court can not determine what 
would have happened if she had not submitted.); See also Brief for Respondent, Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, at 29. 
90. Vinson, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11 30708 at 14687. 
91. [d. at 14,686. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 14,687 
94. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
95. Id. 
11
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were unwelcome.9s It also found that the district court erred in 
not allowing Vinson to present evidence that Taylor harassed 
other female employees.97 The court added that evidence of Vin-
son's dress and sexual fantasies had no place in the litigation.9B 
The court concluded that: 
We have no difficulty in concluding that an em-
ployer may be held accountable for discrimination 
accomplished through sexual harassment by any 
supervisory employee with authority to hire, pro-
mote or to fire . . . The mere existence -or even 
the appearance -of a significant degree of influ-
ence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the 
opportunity to impose upon employees. That op-
portunity is not dependent solely upon the super-
visor's authority to make personnel decisions; the 
ability to direct employers in their work, to evalu-
ate their performances and to recommend person-
nel actions carries attendant power to coerce, in-
timidate and harass. For this reason, we think 
employers must answer for sexual harassment of 
any subordinate by any supervising superior.99 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.100 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether 
sexual harassment hostile environment claims are actionable 
under Title VII.101 The Bank argued that in enacting Title VII, 
Congress intended only to protect the tangible or economic ben-
efits of the workplace, not the psychological and emotional as-
pects.102 The Court rejected this argument, finding nothing in 
the language of Title VII limiting it to economic 
96. [d. at 144. 
97. [d. at 146(emphasis added). 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 146n.36. 
100. [d. at 149-50. 
101. 474 U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 57, 88 L.Ed.2d 46 (1985). The D.C. Circuit denied the 
Bank's petition for a rehearing en banco 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., Scalia, 
J., Starr, J., dissenting). 
102. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB V. Vinson, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 
(1986). 
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discrimination.l03 
In holding that sexual harassment may violate Title VII, the 
Supreme Court relied on both the EEOC guidelines and Rogers 
v. EEOC.l04 The Court noted that although the guidelines are 
not controlling, they are entitled to great deference because they 
represent the administrative interpretation of Title VIllo!> The 
Court explained that the guidelines define sexual harassment to 
include" '[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture.' "l06 The Court found that the EEOC had included hostile 
environment sexual harassment in its guidelines and in doing so 
relied upon the developing body of Title VII law.l07 
The Court also discussed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rog-
ers v. EEOC,108 that a plaintiff could state a cognizable Title VII 
claim by alleging that her employer created a discriminatory 
work environment by treating his clients in a discriminatory 
manner, and therefore violated Title VII.l09 The Supreme Court 
held that there is no legitimate reason not to apply the principle 
of hostile environment discrimination to sexual harassment 
cases, provided that the plaintiff establish a violation of Title 
VII by showing that discrimination based on sex created a hos-
tile or offensive work environment.llo 
The Supreme Court added that in order for sexual harass-
ment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 
abusive working environment.lll The Court next addressed the 
issue of whether, under the circumstances, Vinson had been a 
victim of sexual harassment. It found that the district court 
103. [d. at 2404. The Bank argued that the EEOC guidelines went a step further 
than Congress intended and therefore the guidelines should be ignored. [d. at 2405, Brief 
for Petitioner at 37. . 
104. Id. (Courts rely on the broad language of Title VII to encompass all forms of 
discrimination); See supra, note 13, and accompanying text. 
105. [d. at 2405. 
106. [d. 
107. [d.(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1985». 
108. [d. 
109. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
110. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238). 
111. Id. at 2405-06. Further, the harassment must affect a "term, condition, or privi-
lege" of employment. [d. at 2406. 
13
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erred in holding that she was not.ll2 The Court stated that the 
district court erred by making its determination without consid-
ering the hostile environment sexual harassment theory.1l3 
The Court then discussed the district court's finding that 
Vinson's and Taylor's relationship was voluntary.1l4 The Court 
explained that the key issue in a hostile environment case is not 
whether the sexual advances were voluntary but whether the ad-
vances were unwelcome. Ill> The Court stated 
[t]he fact that sex-related conduct was "volun-
tary," in the sense that the complainant was 
forced to participate against her will, is not a de-
fense to a sexual harassment suit brought under 
Title VII .... The correct inquiry is whether re-
spondent by her conduct indicated that the al-
leged sexual advances were unwelcome, not 
whether her actual participation in sexual inter-
course was voluntary.1l6 
In remanding the case for rehearing, the Court issued sev-
eral evidentiary rulings. The Court observed that the EEOC 
guidelines require courts to examine the "totality of the circum-
stances" and to "look at the record as a whole"1l7 to determine 
whether a valid claim of sexual harassment exists. us Evidence of 
Vinson's dress and sexual fantasies is admissible on the issue of 
whether the sexual advances were welcome or unwelcome.1l9 The 
trial court always has discretion to exclude such evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.120 How-
ever, the court stated "[w]hile the district court must carefully 
112. Id. at 2405. 
113. Id., See e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
114. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. 
115.Id. 
116. Id. at 2407(emphasis added). This is in accordance with the EEOC guidelines 
which define sexual harassment as unwelcome sexual advances. See 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(a)(1985). 
117. Id. at 2406. 
118. Id. (The EEOC guidelines state: "In determining whether the alleged conduct 
constitutes sexual harassment, it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances, 
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the 
facts, on a case by case basis.") 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b). 
119.Id. 
120. Id. at 2407. 
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weigh the applicable considerations in deciding whether to ad-
mit evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule against, its 
admissibility. "l21 
The final issue addressed by the Court was employer liabil-
ity.122 The plaintiff advocated that the Court affirm the Court of 
Appeals' holding imposing strict liability on an employer.123 The 
EEOC filed an amicus brief urging that employers should only 
be held liable in three situations: 1) when the employer has ac-
tual knowledge of the harassment; 2) when the employee files a 
complaint with an appropriate agency; or 3) when there are no 
available means for the employee to complain to management 
officials.124 The Court rejected the EEOC's proposed rule.125 In-
stead, it agreed with the plaintiff that the proposed rule con-
flicted with the EEOC's own guidelines which hold employers 
liable regardless of notice and by examining the circumstances 
as a whole. 128 
The. Court refused to issue a definitive rule on employer lia-
bility, but stated that agency principles should be' applied in 
aiding the determination of employer liability.127 It stated that 
although "[c]ommon law principles may not be transferrable in 
all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define 
121. Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. 403; Cleary, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, 544-48 (3d 
ed. 1984). 
122. Id.; But see, Krieger & Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litiga-
tion, BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1986)(arguing that evidence of plaintiff's past sexual 
behavior should be inadmissible). 
123. Id. at 2408. 
124. Id.; Vinson argued that notice to Taylor, as Vinson's direct supervisor, was no-
tice to the bank. The Bank argued that a hostile environment sexual harassment claim 
should not be actionable under Title VII, and in the alternative, if it is actionable under 
Title VII the plaintiff should be required to prove notice to the employer, and that no-
tice to the perpetrating supervisor should not be considered notice to the employer. Brief 
of Petitioner, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB V. Vinson, at 34-35. 
125. Id.; The Attorney General and the EEOC argued that a sexual harassment hos-
tile environment claim is different from a hostile environment based on race, national 
origin or religion because racial slurs are presumptively unwelcome and sexual advances 
can be denigrating or complimentary. Therefore to hold an employer strictly liable for 
sexual harassment would require employers to intrude upon their employees privacy. 
Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 12, 
30. Vinson effectively countered this argument by pointing out that sexual relations be-
tween employees are not at issue, but sexual abuse, which is always inherently offensive, 
is at issue. Brief for the Respondent at 18. 
126. Vinson 106 S,Ct. at 2408. 
127.Id. 
15
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'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer ... 
surely . . ."128 demonstrates an intent to limit employer liability 
under Title VII.129 Notwithstanding these apparent limitations 
on employer liability, notice or absence of notice does not neces-
sarily determine liability.130 The Court concluded that the court 
of appeals erred in holding that an employer is always automati-
cally liable for sexual harassment regardless of the circum-
stances of the case.131 
I 
Finally, the Court rejected the Bank's argument that an em-
ployer should be shielded from liability when a victim of sexual 
harassment fails to use the company's grievance procedure.132 
The Court explained that in the majority of companies, the 
grievance procedures require a victim of sexual harassment to 
first complain to her supervisor, who is often the harasser.133 Ad-
ditionally, a policy which does not specifically address sexual 
harassment fails to notify employees that there is a company 
policy against such harassment.134 The Court noted that the 
Bank's grievance procedure required Vinson to inform Taylor of 
the harassment. In situations such as Vinson's, failure to use the 
grievance procedure will not insulate an employer from 
, liability.135 
To summarize, the Court held that a sexual harassment hos-
tile environment claim is actionable under Title VII. 136 However 
the Court refused to issue a definitive rule for employer liabil-
ity.137 The Court also held that the totality of the circumstances 
must be examined and that courts should look to agency princi-
ples to determine liability.138 The Court further held that the 
court of appeals erred in entirely disregarding common law 
agency principles and imposing liability on an employer regard-
128. [d. 
129. [d., See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1976). 
130. [d. at 2408-09. 
131- [d. at 2409. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. The Bank's grievance procedure required Vinson to complain to Taylor 
about the harassment. Vinson's protests while she was forcibly raped should have been 
held to be notice to the Bank. 
137. See supra, note 102, and accompanying text. 
138. See supra, note 128, and accompanying text. 
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less of the circumstances of the case.139 
V. CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion,t40 criticized the 
Court's decision not to hold the employer strictly liable.141 He 
argued that most circuit courts have held an employer strictly 
liable for sexual harassment claims of the quid pro quo type, 
hence there was no reason to develop a separate notice require-
ment for hostile environment cases.142 Justice Marshall stated 
that a supervisor is clothed in authority when he hires and fires 
employees and he does not step outside this role when creating a 
hostile environment.143 He stated, further, that the very reason a 
sexually offensive environment can be created is the fact that 
the supervisor is acting within the authority of the employer.144 
He also indicated that an employer can only act through it em-
ployees, and there is no difference between hiring and firing de-
cisions and other decisions related to the work environment.14G 
Therefore, an employer should be held strictly liable if the su-
pervisor has in any way discriminated against a subordinate 
employee.u6 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The significance of the Supreme Court's recognition that 
sexual harassment falls within the rubric of Title VII is aptly 
shown in one commentator's statement: "[T]he Supreme Court's 
recognition of sexual harassment would represent a significant 
step forward in the relative credibility of women in our society. 
Until women's experiences are recognized and understood and 
not trivalized women will remain exiled in a separate caste and 
139. See supra, note 129, and accompanying text. 
140. See supra, note 140, and accompanying text. 
141. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2409; (Brennan,J., Blackum,J., and Stevens, J., joined the 
concurring opinion. Stevens, J., wrote separately stating that he did not find anything 
inconsistent with the Court's opinion and Marshall's opinion and therefore could join 
them both, [d. at 2411. 
142. [d. at 2410. 
143. [d. See supra, note 33 and accompanying text. 
144. [d. at 2410-11. 
145. [d. at 2411. 
146. [d. 
17
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culture of their own. "l4'1 As true as that may be, the Court would 
have further advanced the rights of women if it had affirmed the 
court of appeals' holding that an employer is automatically lia-
ble for sexual harassment perpetrated by its supervisory employ-
ees.H8 By placing a heavier burden of proof on a plaintiff alleg-
ing a hostile environment claim as opposed to a quid pro quo 
claim, the Court has failed to give full credence to women's ex-
perience in the workplace.H9 
The Court applied agency principles incorrectly when it es-
tablished a separate notice requirement for hostile environment 
claimants. As Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion indi-
cated, employers act only through their employees, therefore de-
cision-making authority is necessarily delegated to supervisory 
employees.lllO The supervisor is essentially acting as the em-
ployer when he or she makes employment decisions.1I51 Creating 
an efficient and productive work environment is as important as 
making hiring and firing decisions. The employer should be held 
liable for all acts performed by supervisors.lI52 
In Henson v. City of Dundee,11l3 Judge Clark, in his dissent, 
addressed the distinction made by the majority that, on the one 
hand, when a supervisor creates a discriminatory work environ-
ment, the employer will be held liable only if the plaintiff can 
prove that the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment, but on the other hand held that an employer is strictly 
liable for quid pro quo harassment. 1M Judge Clark stated, it is 
147. Id., See also Hom v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985)(employee held 
strictly for sexual harassment). 
148. Leventer, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: EEOC Guidelines, Conditions 
Litigation, And The United States Supreme Court, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 497 (1981). 
149. The D.C. Circuit's holding of strict liability was followed by at least two district 
courts: Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F.Supp. 78 (D. Alaska 1985); Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 
629 F.Supp. 636 (D.C. Ohio 1986). The Supreme Court's holding, in the context of these 
lower courts, can be seen as a step backward for women's rights. 
150. As one commentator argues: "[T]he lack of effective recognition of hostile envi-
ronment harassment might be explained as stemming from a reluctance in legal circles to 
recognize fully that it is the sexual harassment itself which constitutes the aggrieved 
injury and not the job related reprisal.", Goundry, Sexual Harassment in the Employ-
ment Context: Legal Management of A Working Woman's Experience, 45 U. TORONTO 
FACULTY L. REV., 1, 10 (Spr. 1985). 
151. Vinson 106 S.Ct. at 2410. 
152. Id. 
153. Id.(emphasis added). 
154. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss3/3
1987] TITLE VII LIABILITY 
an incorrect assumption: 
[t]hat the capacity of any person to create a hos-
tile or offensive work environment is not necessa-
rily enhanced or diminished by the degree of, au-
thority which the employer confers upon that 
individual .... [A] supervisor by virtue of his po-
sition is enhanced in his ability to create an offen-
sive environment when compared to the janitor, 
for example, when a supervisor creates such an 
environment women employees are not apt to 
complain for fear of retaliation.11i1i 
397 
Although traditional agency principles cannot be applied to 
Title VII across the board, they do support holding an employer 
strictly liable for the acts of its supervisory employees regardless 
or whether the employer knew or should have known of the ac-
tivity.lli6 Under the Second Restatement of Agency, an employer 
would be held liable for its supervisory employees conduct as 
long as serving their employer played some role in the behav-
ior.m Supervisor's usually perform hiring and firing duties and 
have general authority over the workplace.llis A subordinate em-
ployee relies on the apparent authority of a supervisor when her 
supervisor touches her as much as when he tells her to attend a 
meeting. 
Victim's of sexual harassment rarely have the economic 
power in the workplace to effectively stop this interaction.lliS 
They fear that the supervisor will retaliate by making their work 
situation more difficult if they do complain, or that they will get 
the response "[i]f you can't take working in a man's 
155. Id. at 913. 
156. Id. at 913-14. 
157. See Horn, 755 F.2d at 605; See generally Vermuluen, supra, note 8 at 256; 
Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 535 B.D.L.R. 538-
43 (1981). 
158. Vermuluen, supra, note 8, at 526. The second restatement of agency, § 219, 
comment C, subsection (d), states that an employer will be held liable for the acts of its 
employee's if the employee purported to act on behalf of the employer and there was 
reliance on the apparent authority of the employee. This includes situations in which the 
employer's liability is based upon conduct which is within the apparent authority of the 
employee, as when the employee defames or interferes with another's business and in 
other situations where the agent can cause harm because of the agent's position. Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 219, Comment C (1958). 
159. See generally Lyn Farley, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, 1 (1978). 
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world . . . "l60 Some fear they will get an even more outrageous 
response like the plaintiff in Bundy v. Jackson161 received when 
she complained to her supervisor's supervisor of his harassment: 
"[a]ny man in his right mind would want to rape yoU."l62 In 
these situations where the Vice President of the Bank is the har-
asser, the Supreme Court should have gone a step further and 
held the Bank strictly liable. 
. Another potentially dangerous aspect of the opinion is the 
Court's holding regarding evidence of the plaintiff's dress and 
sexual fantasies. The Court stated that such evidence is 
"[o]bviously relevant to the issue"163 of whether the sexual ad-
vances were welcome or unwelcome and that there is no per se 
rule against its admissibility.164 This evidence is irrelevant to the 
issue and under the Federal Rules of Evidence it is inadmissible. 
Evidence of a women's dress is not relevant to the issue of 
whether she welcomed the sexual demands of her supervisor. 
Under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evi-
dence is evidence which has a tendency to make the existence of 
a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.1611 What a woman wears to work does not 
make it more or less probable that she welcomed sexual de-
mands and· demeaning sexual comments from her supervisor. 
The woman in tight fitting pants, as opposed to a women who 
wears a business suit, does not welcome sexual advances, yet 
both women are subject to sexual harassment in the workplace. 
A woman's dress is no more relevant to the issue of whether she 
welcomed the harassment than the alleged harasser's wardrobe 
is to whether he actually harassed the plaintiff.166 The fact that 
a man wears tight fitting t-shirts to work or baggy suits will not 
make it more probable than not that he sexually harassed a co-
worker. A woman's wardrobe does not evidence her desire to be 
160. See generally C. MacKinnon, supra, note 89; Cohen & Vincellette, Notice, 
Remedy and Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 35 LAB. L. J. 301, 304-05 
(1985); Goundry, supra, note 150, at 12. 
161. Goundry, supra, note 150, at 12. 
162. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
163. [d. at 940. 
164. Vinson 106 S.Ct. at 2407. 
165. [d. 
166. Fed. R. Evid. 401, See generally Cleary, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 540-49 (3d 
ed. 1985). 
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subjected to degrading sexual comments or demands for sexual 
favors. 
The Court's reasoning is reminiscent of the way the law has 
treated rape victims. It was frequently asserted that women who 
wore revealing clothes were "asking" to be raped.l67 Implicitly, 
the Court has suggested that a victim of sexual harassment has 
welcomed the sexual advances of her supervisor when she has 
dressed in a certain way. The Court is perpetuating the sexual 
stereotype that the woman is at fault when she is harassed or 
raped.l6s 
Evidence of the plaintiff's sexual fantasies is not relevant to 
the issue of whether she indicated to the supervisor that the sex-
ual advances were welcome or unwelcome. Vinson had shared 
her personal fantasies with a co-worker.l69 There was no evi-
dence that Taylor knew of these conversations. Yet, the District 
Court admitted Vinson's co-worker's testimony of Vinson's fan-
tasies.l70 The Bank argued that because Vinson shared her fan-
tasies with her friend, Vinson welcomed the sexual relationship 
with Taylor.l7l 
An individual's personal life and intimate sexual secrets do 
not tend to prove that the individual welcomed sexual harass-
ment from another person.172 A woman does not give up her 
right to work in an environment free from discrimination be-
cause she chooses to share aspects of her sexuality with a 
friend. l73 The issue of whether the plaintiff indicated that she 
welcomed the sexual advances can not be resolved by delving 
into the plaintiff's relationship with others. Evidence of other 
relationships and the intimate secrets communicated within that 
relationship are not relevant to the plaintiff's relationship with 
167. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mer-
itor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, at 29 n. 1. 
168. See Priest v. Rotary, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 33,864 (N.D. Cal.1983); Fair Em-
ployment & Housing v. Fresno Hilton Hotel, California Fair Employment Housing Case 
No. FEP 80·81L7-0514se, FEHC Decision No. 84-03 (1984)(relying heavily on Priest v. 
Rotary). 
169. See Brief for Respondent, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, at 40; Priest, 
35 Empl. Prac. Dec. paragraph 33,864. 
170. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36. 
171.Id. 
172. Brief for Petitioner, Meritor Savings Bank, at 27. 
173. See e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 254 n.3; Kreiger, supra, note 122, at 116-22. 
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the alleged harasser. 174 
The Supreme Court stated that arguments concerning 
whether the evidence's probative value is outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect should be made to the district court.175 How-
ever, the district court of the northern district of California ex-
plained, in Priest v, Rotary176 while granting a protective order 
against a defendant's attempt to discover information about the 
plaintiff's past sexual history, to admit such evidence "[m]ight 
intimidate, inhibit or discourage Title VII plaintiffs . . . from 
pursuing their claims [and] would clearly contravene the reme-
dial effect intended by Congress in enacting Title VII and 
should not be tolerated by the federal courtS."I77 The court also 
stated: 
It is often said that those who do not learn from 
history are condemned to repeat it. By carefully 
examining our experience with rape prosecutions, 
however, the courts and the bar can avoid repeat-
ing in this new field of civil sexual harassment 
suits the same mistakes that are now being cor-
rected in the rape context. The courts and Con-
gress have concluded that even in the criminal 
context, the use of evidence of the complainant's 
past sexual behavior is more often harassing and 
intimidating than genuinely probative, and the 
potential for prejudice outweighs whatever proba-
.tive value such evidence may have. Certainly, 
then, in the context of civil suits for sexual har-
assment, absent extraordinary circumstances, in-
quiry into such areas should not be permitted ei-
ther in discovery or trial.178 
The policy considerations influencing the Priest court are 
also applicable to evidence relating to the plaintiff's dress and 
sexual fantasies. Admitting such evidence will only serve to con-
fuse the trier of fact with irrelevant and collateral issues.179 The 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing in Department of 
174. Katz at 254 n.3. 
175. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2407. 
176. 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11 33,864. 
177. [d. at 31,159. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. 
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Fair Employment and Housing v. Fresno Hilton HotePSO stated, 
that regarding evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual history, 
"[I]n sexual harassment cases, care must be taken not to put the 
victim on trial. "lSI 
Suzanne Egan* 
180. FEHC Decision no. 84-03. 
181. Id. 
* Golden Gate University, Class of 1988. 
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